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Abstract
Objectives To empirically test whether offenders consider environmental features at mul-
tiple spatial scales when selecting a target and examine the simultaneous effect of neigh-
borhood-level and residence-level attributes on residential burglars’ choice of residence to 
burglarize.
Methods We combine data on 679 burglaries by 577 burglars committed between 2005 
and 2014 with data on approximately 138,000 residences in 193 residential neighborhoods 
in Ghent, Belgium. Using a discrete spatial choice approach, we estimate the combined 
effect of neighborhood-level and residence-level attributes on burglars’ target choice in a 
conditional logit model.
Results Burglars prefer burglarizing residences in neighborhoods with lower residential 
density. Burglars also favor burglarizing detached residences, residences in single-unit 
buildings, and renter-occupied residences. Furthermore, burglars are more likely to target 
residences in neighborhoods that they previously and recently targeted for burglary, and 
residences nearby their home. We find significant cross-level interactions between neigh-
borhood and residence attributes in burglary target selection.
Conclusions Both area-level and target-level attributes are found to affect burglars’ target 
choices. Our results offer support for theoretical accounts of burglary target selection that 
characterize it as being informed both by attributes of individual properties and attributes 
of the environment as well as combinations thereof. This spatial decision-making model 
implies that environmental information at multiple and increasingly finer scales of spatial 
resolution informs crime site selection.
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Introduction
“Location, location, location”, is a popular advice in real estate. It warns buyers searching 
for a home against a myopic focus on the qualities of individual properties, emphasizing 
the importance of the physical and social environment, such as the lifestyles of neighbors 
and the accessibility of amenities. In sum, the advice underlines that the value of a prop-
erty is, to a large extent, determined by its surroundings.
Real estate agents and prospective homeowners share their interest in real estate with 
burglars. But do burglars follow the ‘triple location’ advice? When burglars decide on 
which home to target, do they myopically focus on the attributes of an individual residence, 
or do they also take into account its physical and social environment? In other words, does 
the choice of a burglary target depend on the target only, on its spatial context, or on both?
How burglars evaluate and select the residences that they target is of theoretical and 
practical importance. Theoretically, it speaks to the rational choice perspective, in particu-
lar to the untested claim that burglars’ target selection is informed both by attributes of 
individual properties and attributes of their environment (Cornish and Clarke 1986). These 
attributes signal the expected costs and benefits of committing a burglary against this target 
(Brantingham and Brantingham 1978). Understanding how burglars select targets has prac-
tical relevance for burglary prevention. If burglary victimization risk is determined only by 
characteristics of the property, then burglary prevention is essentially a private responsibil-
ity. Conversely, if environmental attributes affect burglary risk, communal efforts and col-
lective investments may be necessary and could prove cost-effective.
The major contribution of our research is that it investigates burglary target choice at the 
appropriate level of aggregation—burglars burglarize homes rather than complete neigh-
borhoods—while still considering neighborhood-level attributes that affect these choices 
and taking into account the home locations of the burglars themselves and their limited 
action radius. With a single exception (Vandeviver et  al. 2015a), all studies of burglary 
that used the crime location choice framework have hitherto implicitly assumed that bur-
glars target areas (neighborhoods, postcodes, output areas, or street segments) rather than 
individual properties (Ruiter 2017). In reality, however, it is evident that burglars target 
individual houses or apartments, not neighborhoods, although clearly their choices may 
be affected by neighborhood attributes. Thus, we advance the burglary location choice 
literature by taking into account characteristics of both the property and the surrounding 
neighborhood.
Some prior burglary research has also addressed the potential multilevel structure of 
burglars’ target selection by including home and neighborhood attributes (Bowers et  al. 
2005; Rountree and Land 1996). However, these studies did not take into account the dis-
tance from their homes that burglars would have to travel to and from the targeted proper-
ties, although distance is arguably one of the main determinants of where burglars commit 
burglaries (Ruiter 2017). Ignoring the distances between burglars’ homes and their targets 
may seriously confound the estimated effects of other variables. The finding that burglars 
prefer to offend in disadvantaged neighborhoods, for example, might reflect that many 
burglars themselves live in disadvantaged areas and prefer to offend in the proximity of 
their homes (Bernasco and Nieuwbeerta 2005). In other research traditions, ethnography 
(Wright et al. 1992), interviews (Bennett and Wright 1984), quasi-experimental (Nee and 
Taylor 2000; Taylor and Nee 1988), and experimental approaches (van Gelder et al. 2017) 
have been used to assess which residential characteristics make an attractive burglary tar-
get, but this research has largely overlooked that the evaluation of a property might be 
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affected by its wider environment. In the present study, we use both home and neighbor-
hood attributes, and simultaneously condition on the home locations of burglars. By doing 
so, we combine the strengths of each of these traditions, while avoiding their limitations.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. The next section reviews prior 
empirical research on burglars’ spatial decision-making. In the subsequent section, we 
ground our study in extant theory and formulate hypotheses. In the next two sections, we 
discuss the data and method used in this study. This is followed by a presentation of the 
results and, finally, a conclusion and discussion.
Prior Research
Methods of Research on Burglars’ Spatial Target Selection
The target selection strategies of burglars have been studied with various research methods, 
including ethnographic offender-based interviews, offender-based experimental (vignette) 
studies, and large-scale quantitative studies based on police records or victimization 
surveys.
Findings from interview studies tentatively support the idea that burglars’ evaluate mul-
tiple levels of spatial resolution when selecting a suitable target. They seem to rely on a 
combination of general information, simple heuristics, and more complex deliberation. 
Burglars report that expected resident wealth and other population characteristics guide 
them in their choice of target area, and that they rely on readily observable residence attrib-
utes (e.g., building type) and situational cues (e.g., temporary absence of residents) when 
selecting individual residences (Maguire and Bennett 1982; Nee and Meenaghan 2006; 
Nee and Taylor 2000; Wright and Logie 1988).
Results from quantitative studies and from offender-based experiments also suggest that 
both area and residence attributes affect burglars’ choice of target residences. Offender-
based experiments have typically focused on residence characteristics while quantitative 
research based on victimization surveys or police records has included both levels. Stud-
ies that apply the discrete spatial choice approach, arguably the preferred framework to 
address offender spatial decision-making (Ruiter 2017; Townsley et  al. 2015), have pre-
dominantly investigated the choice of target neighborhood, but not target residence. Three 
exceptions are studies by Bernasco (2010b) who used small area postal codes (contain-
ing 18 residences on average), Frith et  al. (2017) who used street segments (containing 
16 residences on average), and Vandeviver et al. (2015a) who used individual residences, 
as we do in this study. Bernasco (2010b) found that burglars’ target choices were affected 
not only by socio-demographic attributes of the postal code area, but also by attributes 
of adjacent postal code areas. Focusing on the position of street segments in the urban 
road network, Frith et al. (2017) found that segments with large general accessibility and 
large offender-specific accessibility were more likely to be selected for burglary. Vande-
viver et al. (2015a) applied the discrete spatial choice approach to individual houses but did 
not investigate effects of neighborhood-level attributes. They established that residential 
features affect burglars’ appraisal of target suitability.
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Relevant Attributes of Neighborhoods and Residences
In the aftermath of burglary, the risk of future victimization is elevated for both the initial 
target as well as nearby potential targets (Johnson et al. 2007; Townsley et al. 2000, 2003). 
In previous research, it has been argued that it is the involvement of the initial offender that 
gives rise to repeat and near-repeat victimization patterns (Bernasco 2008; Johnson et al. 
2009). As such, repeat offending against the same target or targets nearby the initial target 
may be an important target selection strategy for burglars. Within the context of discrete 
spatial choice studies, Bernasco et  al. (2015) demonstrated that burglars are more likely 
to commit a burglary in an area they had targeted before, particularly if the prior burglary 
was recent. More generally, Lammers et al. (2015) established that prior locations of recent 
offences strongly influence subsequent choices of target areas.
One finding consistently reported across all discrete spatial choice studies is that bur-
glars tend to target neighborhoods nearby their own home (Ruiter 2017). As to generic 
attributes independent of the locations of offenders’ own homes or those of their prior bur-
glaries, various studies have further confirmed that burglars tend to select neighborhoods 
that contain more easily accessible targets, and have a greater supply of potential targets 
available (Bernasco and Nieuwbeerta 2005; Townsley et  al. 2015, 2016). In addition, in 
some studies effects were observed for ethnic heterogeneity boosting the likelihood of an 
area being targeted for burglary (Bernasco and Nieuwbeerta 2005) and neighborhoods with 
a higher degree of rental properties having a greater likelihood of being targeted (Clare 
et  al. 2009). Furthermore, burglars tend to select areas containing train stations, with 
higher real estate values, and higher population turnover rates (Bernasco et al. 2015). In 
the only study to date that applied the discrete spatial choice framework to study burglars’ 
choice of individual residence to burglarize, Vandeviver et al. (2015a) determined that bur-
glars were more likely to select residences closer to their home, terraced dwellings instead 
of semi-detached ones, residences without garages, and residences without central heating 
or air-conditioning systems installed.
However, evidence for the importance of residence-level attributes in burglars’ 
cost–benefit balancing is primarily found through burglar experiments and quantitative 
studies of observational data. In early offender experiment studies burglars were shown 
manipulated photographs to isolate the effects of certain residence attributes on their tar-
get choice (e.g., Nee and Taylor 2000; Taylor and Nee 1988). More recent quantitative 
observational studies apply case–control designs to systematically compare attributes of 
burglarized and non-burglarized residences (e.g., Langton and Steenbeek 2017; Peeters 
et al. 2017). Taken together, the results from these studies highlight that burglars rely on a 
combination of residence attributes to gauge aspects of residence wealth, the risk of detec-
tion and apprehension, and residence accessibility.
Burglars are expected to maximize their anticipated benefits. A straightforward strat-
egy is to burglarize well-off residences instead of poorer ones, or look for targets in areas 
that exhibit stereotypical signs of affluence. A strategy that might require more planning 
or searching could involve selecting the most well-off residences in the more affluent 
areas. Although financial profits may be one of the major motivations for burglary, pre-
vious research produced mixed findings with regard to the importance of wealth-related 
residence attributes for burglary target choice. Burglary experiments revealed that certain 
residence attributes such as general upkeep and property size may help burglars to gauge 
expected payoff and distinguish wealthier target from poorer ones (Taylor and Nee 1988; 
Wright and Logie 1988). In contrast, area and residence attributes of wealth have not been 
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found to impact offender’s area and target choices in quantitative burglary studies (Lang-
ton and Steenbeek 2017; Townsley et al. 2015; Vandeviver et al. 2015a), prompting some 
scholars to suggest that the wide availability of profitable loot in today’s households may 
render scanning the environment for wealth-related cues unnecessary (e.g., Townsley et al. 
2015; Vandeviver et al. 2015a).
Several strategies may be helpful to minimize burglary costs. One strategy may be to 
reduce the risk of detection and apprehension by burglarizing residences when they are 
unoccupied, i.e., while residents are absent. Absence of residents is a major predictor 
for burglary victimization (Bennett and Wright 1984; Bernasco 2009; Waller and Oki-
hiro 1978). Offender experiments reveal that situational cues conveying residents’ pres-
ence such as a car parked on the driveway or lights burning in the house negatively impact 
offenders target choice (Bennett and Wright 1984; Cromwell et al. 1991; Wright and Logie 
1988). Due to the fleeting aspect of resident presence, however, occupancy indicators are 
rarely included in quantitative observational studies (Langton and Steenbeek 2017; Peeters 
et al. 2017). Another strategy to reduce the risk of detection and apprehension may be to 
target residences for which it is more difficult for neighbors or passersby to notice a bur-
glary attempt and intervene. Burglars are more likely to select residences surrounded by 
trees and hedges that block lines of sights and residences that are somewhat secluded (Ben-
nett and Wright 1984; Langton and Steenbeek 2017; Peeters et al. 2017; Taylor and Nee 
1988; Waller and Okihiro 1978; Wright and Logie 1988). Another strategy at the area level 
to contain the risks associated with burglary may be operating in areas where the risks of 
detection are low and guardianship levels are reduced, such as ethnic heterogeneous neigh-
borhoods or areas with high residential mobility (Bernasco and Nieuwbeerta 2005). More 
advanced cost minimization strategy could entail minimizing encounter and detection risks 
at the residence and area level simultaneously.
Finally, in their effort to minimize costs and reduce the time and effort required to com-
mit the offence, burglars prefer easily accessible residences. Results from offender experi-
ments and observational studies reveal that burglars avoid residences with access-restrict-
ing features such as fences and other target hardening devices (Cromwell et  al. 1991; 
Langton and Steenbeek 2017; Logie et al. 1992; Peeters et al. 2017; Waller and Okihiro 
1978; Wright et al. 1995). In contrast, burglars prefer residences with multiple entry points 
such as detached and semi-detached houses (Bennett and Wright 1984; Peeters et al. 2017). 
Similar considerations in burglary location choice at the area level have been observed 
in quantitative studies. Burglars are more likely to select residences in areas that have a 
greater availability of easily accessible targets (Townsley et al. 2015, 2016). More sophis-
ticated target selection schemes could involve prioritizing target accessibility at the resi-
dence and area level.
Integration of Area‑Level and Residence‑Level Choice Criteria in This Study
Despite research evidence highlighting that attributes of multiple spatial levels impact bur-
glars’ target choices, few studies have explicitly acknowledged the simultaneous impor-
tance of area and residence-level attributes (for an exception, see Bowers et al. 2005). In 
particular, extant discrete spatial choice studies consider either area-level or residence-level 
attributes, but not both.
This study integrates neighborhood and residence attributes into a single discrete spatial 
choice model of burglars’ target choice. We explicitly consider the combined importance 
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of neighborhood attributes, target attributes, and their potential interactions. In doing so, 
we examine the sophistication and complexity of burglary target selection in detail.
Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses
Theoretical Framework
Most research on offenders’ spatial decision-making in general, and on burglars’ target 
selection in particular, is grounded in rational choice theory and in crime pattern theory 
(Ruiter 2017). Rational choice theory is a general micro-economic theory of decision-mak-
ing. It assumes that decision-makers maximize benefits and minimize costs. Applied to 
burglary, rational choice theory addresses how burglars choose a suitable target. It empha-
sizes the role of environmental attributes in evaluating costs and benefits, and highlights 
the goal-driven nature of burglars’ spatial decision-making (Bernasco 2010a; Brantingham 
and Brantingham 1984; Cornish and Clarke 1986; Taylor and Gottfredson 1986).
The main assumption of rational choice theory is that offenders engage in a nominally 
rational cost–benefit analysis when they commit crimes and when they select crime targets 
(Cornish and Clarke 2008; Nee and Meenaghan 2006). In the case of residential burglary, 
burglars are expected to compare potential targets in terms of their expected outcomes, and 
to select the residence that minimizes anticipated costs while maximizing anticipated ben-
efits. Burglary benefits are mostly material profits such as the total value of the stolen items 
and ease of access, while burglary costs are predominantly associated with travel efforts 
and the risk of detection and apprehension. Although the target of a burglary is a residence, 
rational choice theory articulates that the costs and benefits associated with the choice of 
a particular target may be impacted by attributes at higher levels of spatial aggregation, in 
particular at the neighborhood level. According to the rational choice perspective (Cornish 
and Clarke 1986, p. 4), what makes a target suitable for burglary is a combination of attrib-
utes of the residence and of its neighborhood context—a hypothesis that is very much in 
line with the ‘triple location’ advice in real estate.
When burglars value the attributes of residences and neighborhoods in order to choose 
their optimal target, the outcome of their judgement is not just a weighted sum of residence 
and neighborhood attributes. Instead, as most human evaluations are context-dependent, 
burglars’ appraisal of residences is likely to be context-dependent too. Therefore, it should 
depend on the attributes of the neighborhood where the residence is located. In theorizing 
about this context-dependence, and in line with the rational choice postulate, we assume 
that for offenders to decide that a particular residence is attractive for burglary, not only the 
residence but also its surrounding neighborhood must meet a certain attractiveness thresh-
old. If the neighborhood falls below the threshold, the residence attributes become irrel-
evant. It would be a waste of time and energy to consider and compare them. The same 
holds true the other way around: neighborhood attributes are irrelevant if a residence does 
not meet the threshold. Therefore, in burglars’ target decision-making, residence-neighbor-
hood interactions theoretically imply that the effects of positively valued residence attrib-
utes and positively valued neighborhood attributes should strengthen each other.
Crime pattern theory addresses where offenders search for suitable targets. It supple-
ments rational choice theory by emphasizing that the spatial knowledge of offenders, like 
all other humans, is constrained by their awareness space (Brantingham and Brantingham 
1981, 1993). This is a mental representation of the locations and routes that someone is 
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familiar with through their engaging in daily routine activities such as attending school, 
working, or taking time off. For offenders, their awareness spaces may also include loca-
tions and routes they know through the commission of previous crimes (Bernasco 2008; 
Bernasco et al. 2015). As a result, offenders often chose burglary targets near their homes, 
schools, workplaces, leisure places, and prior crime scenes.
In summary, the combination of both theories provides a comprehensive theoretical 
framework for burglars’ spatial decision-making: rational choice theory describes how a 
burglar selects a particular target from his or her choice set, while crime pattern theory 
describes an offender’s knowledge of the environment and thus the construction of their 
choice set. In this paper, we combine elements of both rational choice theory and crime 
pattern theory to explain residential burglars’ target selection, and derive hypotheses on 
which area and residence attributes affect burglars’ target choices.
Research Hypotheses
In this section, we articulate our research hypotheses. For each hypothesis, we briefly dis-
cuss the theoretical grounds. First, we formulate our research hypotheses with regard to the 
role of neighborhood-level attributes in burglars’ spatial decision-making. Next, we dis-
cuss our research hypotheses with regard to the influence of residence-level attributes on 
burglars’ target selection. Finally, we articulate our research hypotheses with regard to the 
combined effect of neighborhood and residence attributes.
Hypotheses on Effects of Neighborhood Characteristics
Our first hypothesis relates to the perceived rewards of the burglary. It is difficult for bur-
glars to assess the payoff of a burglary because valuable items are hidden inside proper-
ties. Burglars must therefore estimate the prospective value of what they might steal on 
the basis of cues that are observable from the outside. The affluence of a neighborhood 
is likely a good proxy for the expected value of what can be stolen from any residence in 
that particular neighborhood (Bernasco and Nieuwbeerta 2005; Townsley et al. 2015). We 
therefore hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 1 Burglars prefer burglarizing residences in more affluent neighborhoods 
over residences in poorer neighborhoods.
Target availability is a second important choice criterion. Burglars will generally prefer 
neighborhoods with a high target density (a greater number of residences) over neighbor-
hoods with a low target density, because the former situation allows for more and a greater 
variety of alternative targets than the latter situation (Bernasco and Nieuwbeerta 2005; 
Townsley et al. 2015, 2016). At the time of the burglary, many residences may be unsuit-
able for burglary for a number of reasons, for example, because the residents are home. In 
such situations, the availability of a greater number of alternative residences to burglar-
ize is a benefit over the availability of fewer alternative burglary targets. Consequently, we 
hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 2 Burglars prefer burglarizing residences in neighborhoods with a higher 
target density over residences in neighborhoods with a lower target density.
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At the cost side of the equation, burglars will likely avoid neighborhoods where they 
expect that the risk of detection and arrest is elevated, as indicated by high social cohesion 
and high social control (Vandeviver et al. 2015b). Conversely, in terms of benefits, burglars 
will prefer neighborhoods with lower levels of guardianship and reduced chances of detec-
tion and arrest. Rooted in social cohesion and social disorganization literature (Sampson 
and Groves 1989), our third hypotheses asserts that neighborhoods with higher levels of 
ethnic heterogeneity may impede social interactions in the neighborhood (Bernasco and 
Nieuwbeerta 2005). This may result in reduced levels of guardianship and a decreased 
chance of detection. We hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 3 Burglars prefer burglarizing residences in neighborhoods with higher eth-
nic heterogeneity over residences in neighborhoods with lower ethnic heterogeneity.
Similar to ethnic heterogeneity, neighborhoods with higher proportions of rental units 
are associated with low residential stability which impedes social cohesion and social 
interaction, and may inhibit guardianship (Clare et al. 2009; Tseloni et al. 2002; Xie and 
McDowall 2008). Our fourth hypotheses therefore asserts that:
Hypothesis 4 Burglars prefer burglarizing residences in neighborhoods with higher pro-
portions of rental units over residences in neighborhoods with lower proportions of rental 
units.
Finally, crime pattern theory suggests that offenders select targets in areas they are 
familiar with because they committed prior crimes in these areas. This proposition moti-
vates the fifth hypothesis. Like legal activities, engaging in illegal activities allows bur-
glars to expand their awareness space and identify suitable targets. In support of this claim, 
recent research has demonstrated that burglars and other offenders are likely to commit 
subsequent crimes in neighborhoods where they committed prior crimes (Bernasco et al. 
2015; Lammers et al. 2015), in particular if the previous crime was recent and of the same 
type. To account for this finding, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 5 Burglars prefer burglarizing residences in neighborhoods where they 
previously committed burglaries over residences in neighborhoods where they did never 
before commit burglaries.
Hypotheses on Effects of Residence Characteristics
Ultimately, a specific residential unit within a particular neighborhood is the actual target 
of a residential burglary. Assessments of anticipated costs and benefits should therefore 
also affect target selection at the building and residence level. The extent to which a build-
ing is accessible is likely an important consideration when deliberating target choice (Ber-
nasco and Nieuwbeerta 2005; Townsley et al. 2015). Detached and semi-detached build-
ings are easier to access than terraced buildings and residences in apartment complexes 
because the former can be accessed both at the street side and backside (Bernasco 2009; 
Bernasco and Nieuwbeerta 2005; Hakim et al. 2001; Townsley et al. 2016; Weisel 2002). 
Furthermore, the higher density of occupants in terraced buildings and apartment com-
plexes may also elevate the risk of detection. We therefore hypothesize that:
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Hypothesis 6 Burglars prefer burglarizing residences in a detached building or in a semi-
detached building over residences in a terraced building or apartment complex.
As already briefly touched upon, burglars seek to reduce their risk of detection and 
apprehension and therefore must anticipate the level of surveillance and guardianship at 
the time of the burglary (Bernasco 2009; Ratcliffe 2002). Burglars may rely on several 
strategies to gauge detection and apprehension risk. A straightforward strategy is to assess 
the likelihood that someone is present in the target residence at the time of the burglary or, 
if the residence is part of a multi-unit building, in other residences in the building. More 
occupants in a residence may increase the likelihood of someone being present at the time 
of the burglary, resulting in higher natural surveillance and greater risk of detection (Vol-
laard and van Ours 2011). Similarly, targeting residences in a multi-unit housing complex 
could be riskier since there is more natural surveillance and neighbors could walk in on the 
burglary (Hakim et al. 2000; Weisel 2002). Therefore, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 7 Burglars prefer burglarizing residences with fewer occupants over resi-
dences with more occupants.
Hypothesis 8 Burglars prefer burglarizing single-unit residences over residences in 
multi-unit buildings.
Because not only the number of potential guardians is relevant but also the likelihood 
that guardians will actually exercise social control by intervening in the burglary or calling 
the police, burglars are expected to prefer buildings and residences that signal reduced lev-
els of social control and social cohesion. Similar to the counterpart hypothesis at the neigh-
borhood  level (see hypothesis 4), burglars may prefer burglarizing renter-occupied resi-
dences rather than owner-occupied residences. Because renters tend to move more often 
than homeowners, rental status may inhibit guardianship and reduce the risk of detection 
since it could be more difficult for neighbors to establish whether visitors are legitimate or 
not (Andresen 2011; Rephann 2009). We hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 9 Burglars prefer burglarizing renter-occupied residences over owner-occu-
pied residences.
Contained within crime pattern theory is also the argument that familiarity with cer-
tain places drives target selection and people are most familiar with the areas around their 
homes. Burglars are therefore expected to have better knowledge about targets near their 
home than about more distant targets and will therefore prefer to burglarize nearby resi-
dences over distant residences. The same hypothesis can be derived from rational choice 
theory if we assume that travel away from home represents one of the most significant 
costs that burglars would like to minimize (Vandeviver et al. 2015b). We hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 10 Burglars prefer burglarizing residences closer to their home over resi-
dences further away from their home.
Note that whereas all other hypotheses refer to attributes of residences and neighbor-
hoods that are generic (they have the same value for all burglars, e.g., the dwelling type of 
a residence or the affluence of a neighborhood), hypotheses 5 and 10 address attributes that 
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are idiosyncratic (they have different values for different burglars). In other words, prior 
burglary (hypothesis 5) is a neighborhood attribute that varies both across burglars and 
across neighborhoods, and home distance (hypothesis 10) is a residence attribute that var-
ies both across burglars and across residences.
Hypothesis on the Combined Effects of Neighborhood and Residence Characteristics
Finally, to examine rational choice theory’s claim that target suitability is ultimately 
assessed through a combination of attributes at the residence and neighborhood level, we 
test all possible 25 first-order cross-level interaction effects that are implied by the pre-
viously formulated hypotheses (hypotheses 1 through 10). For each neighborhood-level 
attribute, we examine to which extent it moderates the relationship between residential 
attributes and the likelihood of burglary target selection. In terms of the burglars’ decision-
making, this comes down to the question of whether burglars’ appraisal of residence attrib-
utes depends on attributes of the neighborhood where the residence is located. In think-
ing about how burglars value the attributes of individual residences differently in some 
neighborhoods than in others, it seems plausible to assume that for offenders to perceive 
a particular residence as attractive for burglary, both the targeted residence and the sur-
rounding neighborhood must be sufficiently attractive: each attribute must meet a certain 
attractiveness threshold. This proposition implies that if the residence itself is unattractive 
(e.g., because it is well-guarded or difficult to enter) then neighborhood attractiveness is 
less relevant or even irrelevant for the burglar’s decision. Similarly, if the neighborhood is 
perceived as unattractive (e.g., because it does not signal affluence or have high levels of 
guardianship) then the attractiveness of the residence is less relevant or even irrelevant. In 
other words, the value that a burglar assigns to a potential target positively depends on both 
the residence and its neighborhood being perceived as sufficiently attractive.
Because each of the 5 neighborhood attributes and each of the 5 residence attributes 
described above are interpreted in terms of target attractiveness (adding to the potential 
benefits of the robbery or to reducing its potential costs) the proposition implies 5 × 5 = 25 
interaction effects between neighborhood attributes and residence attributes. To illustrate 
the logic of this set of combined hypotheses, we provide two examples: an interaction 
between residence accessibility and neighborhood affluence, and an interaction between 
residence occupancy and neighborhood proximity.
The proposed interaction between residence accessibility and neighborhood afflu-
ence claims that the target value of a residence is not only larger for accessible residences 
in any neighborhood and that it is larger for any residence located in affluent neighbor-
hoods, but also that residence accessibility increases the target value of a residence more 
in affluent neighborhoods than it does in disadvantaged neighborhoods. In other words, 
some neighborhoods are perceived by some burglars to be below the affluence threshold, 
and residences in these neighborhoods are not considered attractive, irrespective of their 
accessibility.
The proposed interaction between residence occupancy and neighborhood proximity 
claims that, in addition to the main effects of residence occupancy and neighborhood prox-
imity, the negative effects of residence occupancy are stronger in nearby neighborhoods 
than in distant neighborhoods. In other words, some neighborhoods are perceived by some 
burglars to be above the maximum distance threshold, and residences in these neighbor-
hoods are not considered attractive, irrespective of the occupancy measure.
In sum, we assert that:
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Hypothesis 11 The relationships between residential attributes and burglars’ preference 
for burglarizing a residence vary according to neighborhood-level attributes, whereby the 
effects of positively valued residential attributes strengthen the effects of positively valued 
neighborhood attributes.
Data
In this analysis, we assess the extent to which neighborhood attributes and residence attrib-
utes determine the target selection of burglars. To that aim, we combine police-recorded 
information on burglars and the residential burglaries they committed between 2005 and 
2014 with Census information on residences and neighborhoods in 2011 for Ghent, Bel-
gium. This northwestern Belgian city covers an area of approximately 156 km2 and had a 
population of 247,486 residents on 1 January 2011.
Burglaries and Burglars
To be included in the analysis and in line with previous crime location choice studies (Frith 
et al. 2017; Townsley et al. 2015), we apply six selection criteria to burglaries and burglars: 
(1) the burglary is cleared; (2) the burglar resides in Ghent; (3) the home address of the 
burglar is available; (4) at most one burglar is included per burglary; (5) the burglar home 
address and burglary address link to a Census address; and (6) the burglar’s prior offence 
records during the past year are available. Applying the six criteria leads to the selection of 
679 burglaries that involved 577 unique burglars and 633 unique target residences. Similar 
data selection criteria and sample sizes have been applied in previous crime location choice 
studies. Details of the selection process are discussed in the following sections and are 
summarized in Table 1.
The Burglary is Cleared
To assess the role of the offenders’ home locations and the locations of any previous bur-
glaries they committed, the analysis must include only cleared burglaries. Between 2005 
Table 1  Selection criteria for burglary cases
No Selection criterion Burglaries Burglars
Police-recorded burglary in Ghent 18,974 1872
1 Burglary is cleared 1741 1871
2 Burglar resides in Ghent 1114 1132
3 Home address of the burglar is available 1085 1107
4 At most one burglar is included per burglary 1085 876
5 Burglar and burglary address link to a Census address 726 606
6 Burglar’s prior offences during past year are available 679 577
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and 2014, the local police department cleared 1871 residential burglaries committed in 
Ghent.1 Clearance implies that at least one offender was identified.
The Burglar Resides in Ghent
Consistent with the existing crime location choice literature (e.g., Bernasco et  al. 2016; 
Frith et al. 2017), we require that at least one of the burglars involved in a burglary must 
reside in Ghent is. It is motivated by the structure of the burglary location choice model, 
in which burglaries make up the sample frame, where they are committed is the depend-
ent variable, and where the offenders live is one of the independent variables. In line with 
the finding that the home-crime distance follows a steep decay function (Townsley and 
Sidebottom 2010), 93% of all cleared burglaries in Ghent (N = 1114) involved at least one 
offender that resided in Ghent.
The Home Address of the Burglar is Available
Occasionally, the police register burglars as residents of Ghent without recording their 
home addresses. Because we require addresses to calculate distances between burglars’ 
homes and their targets, only burglaries with a valid burglar home address, 97% of the 
remaining burglaries (N = 1085), were included.
At Most One Burglar is Included per Burglary
Burglaries are often committed alone, but can also involve multiple collaborating offend-
ers. In Ghent, 25.33% (N = 441) of all cleared burglaries is committed by at least two 
offenders. The analysis of multi-actor decisions, including location choices, introduces a 
number of theoretical and statistical complexities that have been documented elsewhere 
in more detail (Bernasco 2006; Lammers 2017). To avoid these complexities, we adopted 
a procedure that has become the standard in the literature (see also Bernasco et al. 2012; 
Frith et al. 2017): one burglar was randomly selected from each co-offending group and 
was subsequently analyzed as a single-offender location choice problem. This procedure is 
supported by the finding that location choices of single and co-offending burglars are simi-
lar (Bernasco 2006). Application of this criterion reduces the number of involved burglars 
(N = 876), but does not change the number of burglaries (N = 1085).
The Burglar Home Address and Burglary Address Link to a Census Address
The burglar home address and the burglary address in the police records need to be linked 
unambiguously to an address in the Census data (where the attributes of the residence are 
stored). This was the case for at least 67% of burglaries (N = 726). Reasons for ambigu-
ity include non-uniquely identified burglary addresses and non-existent burglar home 
addresses. Although we cannot determine the causes of these ambiguities with certainty, 
in both situations the burglary cases should most likely not have been selected in the first 
1 The clearance rate of 9% is similar to burglary clearance rates reported for most other Western countries 
(e.g., Bernasco and Nieuwbeerta 2005; Clare et al. 2009; Frith et al. 2017).
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place because either the burglary had been registered at multiple addresses, or the offender 
lived outside the study area and address information was not available.
The Burglar’s Prior Offences During the Past Year are Available
Testing whether burglars are more likely to target properties in neighborhoods they tar-
geted during the prior 6 months, required us to define the first half of 2005 as a 6-month 
‘buffer’: burglaries committed in January–June 2005 are only used to identify the offending 
histories for burglaries committed in July–December 2005. Consequently, we analyzed as 
cases only the 679 burglaries in the period July 2005 through December 2014 (89%).2
Sample Selectivity due to Application of Selection Criteria
Applying these criteria might introduce selectivity in our included sample. However, com-
parison of the characteristics of the burglarized neighborhoods in the sample of cleared 
burglaries (N = 1741; see Step 1, Table 1) and those for the sample of burglaries included 
in the model estimation procedure (N = 679; see Step 6; Table 1) allows us to conclude that 
selectivity is not a concern in this study. As depicted in Appendix Table 5, the burglarized 
neighborhoods included in the final sample are similar to those present in the initial sample 
of burglary data in terms of mean values for all included neighborhood characteristics. Due 
to lack of personal data on burglars, however, we cannot explore the impact of our selec-
tion criteria on the sample of included burglars.
Neighborhood and Residence Data
As argued in the introduction, residences are the primary targets in residential burgla-
ries. Strictly speaking, burglars do not target larger entities like streets or neighborhoods, 
although clearly the selection of a specific residence might be affected by its spatial envi-
ronment. The analysis of burglary target choice should thus preferably define ‘residence’ as 
its main unit of analysis (Bernasco 2010a; Vandeviver et al. 2015a). Fortunately, our police 
and Census data have enough spatial resolution to allow us to use individual residences as 
our main units of analysis. In order to assess the importance of neighborhood attributes 
relative to residence attributes, we also use information at the neighborhood level. Both 
residence and neighborhood variables are from the 2011 Belgian Census (FOD Economie 
Algemene Directie Statistiek—Statistics Belgium 2011).3
2 Because offenders might learn from their accomplices, offending histories were identified before ran-
domly selecting one offender from each co-offending group (Step 4).
3 A third and intermediate level of aggregation between residences and neighborhoods—street segments—
might be a meaningful addition to our models. Unfortunately, we cannot reliably link residences to the 
street segments along which they are located because address information was removed by Statistics Bel-
gium during the geocoding process, and address coordinates were withheld by Statistics Belgium to comply 
with privacy regulations and prevent identification of individual addresses in the Census data. Neighbor-
hood data, however, remain unaffected by this procedure because residences are linked to neighborhoods 
separately using a unique neighborhood identifier.
 Journal of Quantitative Criminology
1 3
Neighborhood Data
The Census subdivides Ghent in geographical entities called ‘statistical districts’, of which 
193 have a residential function. Throughout this paper we refer to these entities as ‘neigh-
borhoods’. The neighborhoods in this study are similarly constructed to the areas used in 
most previous discrete spatial choice studies and are comparable or smaller in size (e.g., 
Lammers et  al. 2015; Menting et  al. 2016). On average, the 193 residential neighbor-
hoods have a population of 1287 residents (standard deviation [sd] = 1299), 717 residences 
(sd = 785) and cover an area of 0.79 (sd = 1.00) square kilometers.
Four neighborhood attributes and a prior burglary variable are included in the analysis. 
Unless otherwise stated, all variables reflect the situation on 1 January 2011. Neighbor-
hood attributes vary between residences within different neighborhoods, but not between 
residences located in the same neighborhood. Descriptive statistics of the neighborhood 
variables are presented in Table 2. We briefly discuss each neighborhood attribute and how 
it relates to the behavioral rule:
• Median income: an affluence measure capturing the median income averaged for 2005–
2012 in € 1000.
• Residential density: a target availability measure capturing the number of 1000 resi-
dences per square kilometer in the neighborhood.
Table 2  Descriptive statistics of neighborhood (N = 193) and residences (N = 138,321)
Level Variable Mean S.D.
Neighborhood Median income (€ 1000) 22.05 4.85
Number of residences (1000/km2) 1.98 2.38
Proportion non-Belgians 8.80 10.13
Proportion rental units 32.76 16.73
% N
Residence Building type
 Terraced 59.70 82,573
 Semi-detached 11.03 15,263
 Detached 14.34 19,829
 Apartment 14.93 20,656
Number of residences in building
 One residence 53.52 74,034
 Two residential units 3.96 5482
 Three or more residential units 42.51 58,805
Rental unit
 Yes 39.40 54,496
 No 60.60 83,825
Mean S.D.
Number of occupants 1.74 1.53
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• Proportion non-Belgian residents: an operationalization of ethnic heterogeneity captur-
ing guardianship that is measured as the percentage of non-Belgian residents living in 
the neighborhood.4
• Proportion rental units: a guardianship metric that is calculated as the percentage of 
rental units in the neighborhood. The variable is obtained by aggregating the residen-
tial rental status (see “Hypotheses on Effects of Residence Characteristics” section) for 
each neighborhood.
• Prior burglary in neighborhood: a variable derived from the burglars prior burglary 
records, indicating whether the offender or one of his accomplices had committed a 
prior burglary in the neighborhood within 0-6 months before the current burglary.
Residence Data
The Census identified 138,321 residences in Ghent. For each residence, Statistics Belgium 
provided a unique identification number and five variables. Two variables apply to the resi-
dence itself: number of occupants, and rental status. Two variables apply to the building 
in which the residence is located: the building construction type, and the number of resi-
dences inside the building. Detached residences and residences in terraced housing (town 
houses) are defined as separate buildings, but apartments (flats) are part of a single build-
ing. In addition, Statistics Belgium provided a dataset that included, for each burglary, the 
distances between the offender’s home address and all other addresses in Ghent.5 Descrip-
tive statistics of the residence variables are presented in Table 2. We briefly discuss each 
residence attribute and describe how it relates to the behavioral rule.
• Building construction type: an accessibility metric indicating if the residence is located 
in a detached building, a semi-detached building, a terraced building (townhouse), or 
part of an apartment complex.
• Number of occupants: a risk measure counting the number of people registered at that 
address.
• Number of residences inside the building: a risk measure indicating whether the resi-
dence is located in a single-unit building, two-unit building or multi-unit housing com-
plex.
• Rental status: a guardianship measure indicating if a residence is rented out or not.
• Distance: an effort measure capturing the Euclidean distance between the residence and 
the burglar’s home.
4 Ethnic heterogeneity is an indicator of qualitative variability that is usually measured with the Herfindahl 
index (sometimes referred to as the Blau index or index of qualitative variation). Here, we use proportion 
non-Belgian residents for lack of more detailed information on ethnicity in the Census data. However, this 
is of little concern since ethnic segregation is much less pronounced in Belgium, and more generally West-
ern Europe, than in the USA. Measures of ethnic heterogeneity and proportion non-natives are very strongly 
correlated and almost equivalent empirically (around .95, see Bernasco and Luykx 2003, p. 989).
5 To prevent identification of individual residences in the Census data, Statistics Belgium randomly shifted 
address coordinates up to 25 m along both the x-axis and the y-axis before computing distances.
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Method
To study burglars’ target choices, we apply the discrete choice framework to burglary loca-
tion choices, an approach introduced in criminology by Bernasco and Nieuwbeerta (2005). 
This approach permits including target features (e.g., neighborhood and residence attrib-
utes), offender features (e.g., offending histories), and target-offender interactions (e.g., 
distance from the offender’s home to each alternative) in a single model (for a detailed 
discussion, see Ruiter 2017). Like most previous crime location choice studies, we use the 
conditional logit model.6 However, unlike all previous studies, we simultaneously estimate 
the effect of both neighborhood-level and residence-level attributes on burglar’s selection 
of targets.
Consistent with the microeconomic theory of random utility maximization, the condi-
tional logit model postulates that burglars select, from a set of exhaustive and mutually 
exclusive residences, a single residence to burglarize. Burglars are assumed to evaluate 
the utility of each residence in their choice set and select that particular residence that is 
expected to yield the highest utility. The model has been successfully applied in many 
crime location choice studies and to a variety of crime types, including burglary (Townsley 
et al. 2015), robbery (Bernasco et al. 2012), rioting (Baudains et al. 2013), and theft from 
motor vehicles (Johnson and Summers 2015).
Analytic Strategy
We estimate three main effects models to determine the effects of neighborhood and resi-
dence attributes on target choice.7 The first model includes the four neighborhood attrib-
utes, and the prior burglary variable, as well as the distance from each residence to the 
offender’s home. Corresponding with most crime location choice studies, this model 
describes how neighborhood attributes affect burglars’ choice of residence to burglarize. 
The second model includes the four residence attributes and the distance measure. The 
third model estimates the combined impact of neighborhood and residence attributes, prior 
burglary, and distance.
In addition, we estimate 25 cross-level interaction effect models to determine to which 
extent the relationships between residential attributes and the likelihood of burglary target 
selection vary according to neighborhood-level attributes. If burglars indeed evaluate the 
suitability of a property by gauging both property and the neighborhood simultaneously, 
6 We considered using the nested logit model (Ben-Akiva and Lerman 1985) instead of the conditional 
logit model. The nested logit model is a more flexible discrete choice model that does not assume independ-
ence of alternatives within the same group of alternatives. This model is well-suited for the analysis of 
hierarchically structured choice sets such as the choice of residences nested in neighborhoods but requires 
considerable computational resources. Even in a high-performance computing environment, estimation of 
a nested logit model on a choice set as large as our dataset (i.e. 138,321 alternative residence nested in 193 
neighborhoods for each of the 679 burglaries) proved to be computationally prohibitive. This forced us to 
resort to the computationally less demanding but less flexible conditional logit model. If the assumption of 
independence of residences within the same neighborhood is violated, the conditional logit model will still 
yield unbiased coefficient estimates, but standard errors may be underestimated. This requires us to be care-
ful and conservative in interpreting significance levels.
7 We computed generalized variance inflation factors (GVIFs) to assess multicollinearty among the inde-
pendent variables in the main effects models. GVIFs > 10 suggest severe multicollinearity. No GVIFs > 3.88 
were observed, indicating that multicollinearity is of no concern.
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the presence of cross-level interactions is implied. For example, burglars might prefer to 
target detached houses in affluent neighborhoods but not in poorer neighborhoods. Alterna-
tively, Bowers et al. (2005) demonstrated that, relative to affluent areas, detached houses in 
deprived areas were particularly vulnerable to burglary, a finding they tentatively attributed 
to the possibility that in deprived areas detached housing may clearly signal relative afflu-
ence (indicating higher burglary yield) whereas in affluent areas, detached housing may be 
less distinctive. However, the current state of theory does not allow specification of specific 
a priori hypotheses on how property-level and neighborhood-level variables might interact. 
Therefore, we explored all potential first-order cross-level interactions. Due to its limited 
size, our sample is underpowered for testing multiple interactions simultaneously. Instead, 
we tested all 5 (neighborhood) × 5 (residence) potential cross-level interaction effects 
separately.
The integrated main effects and the interaction effects models are most relevant for our 
argument. They also most closely correspond with the rational choice perspective’s con-
ceptualization of burglary target selection as a dual-level spatial decision-making model. 
For these reasons as well as parsimony, we only discuss the integrated and interaction mod-
els in the next section.
Table 3  Model estimates for integrated main effects conditional logit models of burglary target choice in 
Ghent, Belgium (679 burglaries, 577 burglars, 138,321 residential units)
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
1 The offender committed a previous burglary in the neighborhood less than 6 months ago (0/1)
Variables Integrated main 
effects model
Exp(B) (SE(B))
Median income (€1000) .97 (.02)
Residential density .90*** (.02)
Proportion non-Belgians .99 (.01)
Proportion rental units 1.00 (.01)
Prior burglary in neighborhood 0–6 months1 18.99*** (.16)
Building type: semi-detached 1.14 (.15)
Building type: detached 1.35* (.13)
Building type: part of apartment building .79 (.15)
Number of occupants 1.01 (.03)
Number of residential units: two residential units .78 (.19)
Number of residential units: three or more residential units .58*** (.10)
Rental unit: Yes 2.01*** (.08)
Distance (km) .45*** (.04)
AIC (df) 23,823.64 (13)
BIC (df) 23,882.41 (13)
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Results
Table 3 displays estimated odds ratios (OR) and standard errors (SE) as well as the Akaike 
(AIC) and the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) to assess relative model fit for the inte-
grated main effects only model.8 The ORs indicate how much the odds of a residence being 
selected increase multiplicatively given a one-unit change in the associated explanatory 
variable. The AIC and the BIC offer insight in the quality of the models relative to each 
other, and in doing so make a trade-off by rewarding goodness-of-fit and penalizing model 
complexity. Smaller values for both information criteria are preferred (Raftery 1995).
Overall Model Fit
First, we assess relative model fit for the main effects only models (see Table 3 and Appen-
dix Table 6). The smallest AIC and BIC values are observed for the integrated main effects 
model. This suggests that an optimal description of burglars’ target choices requires both 
neighborhood and residence attributes.
Integrated Main Effects Model
We begin by evaluating the role of neighborhood attributes in burglars’ target selection 
process. As shown in Table 3, residential density and prior burglary activity in the same 
neighborhood are significantly related to the likelihood of a residence being burglarized, 
while median income, proportion non-Belgians, and proportion rental units are not. First, 
in contrast to what was hypothesized, burglars preferred residences in neighborhoods with 
lower residential density. For every additional 1000 residences per square kilometer in a 
neighborhood, the odds of the residence being burglarized decrease by 10%. Although 
this finding conflicts with results of previous burglary location choice studies (Bernasco 
and Nieuwbeerta 2005; Townsley et al. 2015), it might indicate that burglars prefer reduc-
ing the risk of detection and apprehension instead of having access to a greater variety of 
alternatives.
Second, as hypothesized and in line with previous findings elsewhere (Bernasco et al. 
2015; Lammers et al. 2015), burglars are more likely to target residences in neighborhoods 
where they recently committed a previous burglary, possibly because committing the prior 
burglary helps them to identify potential future targets. The odds of a burglar selecting a 
residence in a neighborhood where they committed a burglary in the past 6 months are 19 
times greater than the odds of selecting a residence in another neighborhood. This is a very 
strong effect size in the same order of magnitude as those previously reported (Lammers 
et al. 2015).
Three out of four residential features are significantly associated with burglary target 
selection. Building construction type, number of residential units, and rental status are sig-
nificantly related to burglary target selection. In contrast, number of occupants does not 
8 The parameters of the neighborhood only and residential unit only main effects models are similar to 
those of the integrated main effects model. Moreover, the integrated main effects model exhibits superior 
model fit in comparison with the neighborhood only and residential unit only main effects models (as indi-
cated by AIC and BIC). Therefore, the parameters of the neighborhood only and residential unit only main 
effects models are only reported in Appendix Table 4.
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significantly impact burglary target selection. However, the observed effects offer only 
partial confirmation for our hypotheses. First, some of the results with regard to build-
ing type corroborate our hypothesis. Overall, the building type of a residence was signifi-
cantly associated with the likelihood of being selected for burglary (likelihood ratio test 
statistic = 4.95; Δdf = 3; p < .050). However, burglars only seemed to have a preference 
for detached houses over terraced houses. Detached residences had 35% greater odds of 
being burglarized than terraced residences. Burglars did not distinguish between terraced 
houses, semi-detached houses and residences in apartment buildings. Although burglars’ 
preference for detached residences is in line with findings of other studies (Bernasco 2009; 
Hakim et  al. 2001; Peeters et  al. 2017), it contradicts the results of a previous burglary 
location choice study at the residence level, which found that burglars preferred terraced 
residences (Vandeviver et al. 2015a). However, the conflicting findings may be rooted in 
the design of the previous study, which considered burglaries committed in a 3000 km2 
rural area in which terraced houses were spatially concentrated in high-burglary urban 
areas. In this study, we considered burglaries committed in a single, predominantly urban 
area.
Second, confirming our hypothesis with respect to the number of residential units per 
building, burglars preferred residences in single-unit buildings over residences in multi-
unit housing complexes. Indeed, residences in single-unit buildings have a 42% higher 
odds of target selection than residences in a building with three or more residential units. 
Although the number of residential units per building was overall significantly associated 
with burglary target selection (likelihood ratio test statistic = 13.81; Δdf = 2; p < .001), we 
did not find a significant difference between residences in single-unit buildings and those in 
two-unit buildings.
Third, confirming our hypothesis, burglars prefer renter-occupied residences. Renter-
occupied residence have 101% greater odds of being selected than owner-occupied resi-
dences. Although this finding confirms our hypothesis, it is at odds with previous research 
on residential burglary risk in which it was established that owner-occupied residences are 
more at risk of burglary (Vollaard and van Ours 2011).
Finally, with respect to distance our results confirm that burglars have a preference for 
burglarizing residences nearby their home address, a finding that has been demonstrated 
repeatedly in prior research (Ruiter 2017). It is interpreted as the most salient externaliza-
tion of offender cost-minimization strategies (Vandeviver et al. 2015b). Here, we found that 
the odds of a residence being burglarized decrease by 55% for every kilometer a residence 
is further away from the offender’s home.
Cross‑Level Interaction Effects
Next, we explored possible cross-level interaction effects between our five neighborhood 
and five residential attributes. Table  4 summarizes the results of the 25 tests in terms of 
statistical significance. Complete numerical results are displayed in Appendix Tables 5, 6, 
7, 8, 9 and 10, while a graphical presentation of the significant interactions is provided in 
Appendix Figs. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14. By way of example and to facili-
tate the interpretation of these figures in the “Appendix”, the cross-level interaction between 
distance and neighborhood median income is displayed in Fig. 1 and interpreted in detail.      
The top panel of the figure shows how the effect size of distance (in kilometers) varies 
across neighborhood median income levels (in € 1000). Over the full range of the income 
variable, the odds ratio effect of distance is negative and varies between .37 (at median 
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income of approximately € 13,000) and .64 (at median income of approximately € 34,000). 
This implies that burglars prefer to travel short distances and to burglarize residences close 
to their own homes, and that this preference is stronger when they compare residences 
amongst poorer target neighborhoods than when they compare amongst more affluent tar-
get neighborhoods. The bottom panel displays the reverse projection of this interaction: it 
shows how the effect size of neighborhood median income varies across distance. Over 
the full range of distance, the odds ratio effect of median income varies between a slightly 
negative .92 (at distance of 0 km) and a positive 1.27 (at distance of approximately 12 km). 
Up to distances of around 3 km, burglars prefer residences in poorer over more affluent 
neighborhoods, but their preference reverses beyond 3  km. When comparing residences 
amongst target neighborhoods beyond 3 km, differences in affluence become an increas-
ingly important decision criterion. In other words, the interaction effect suggests that 
burglars may seek to compensate their travel efforts by selecting targets in more affluent 
neighborhoods. Offending nearby home may be indicative of opportunistic target selection 
strategies, whereas a greater degree of planning may come into play when targeting higher-
value targets farther away from home. As shown in Table 4 and in Appendix Table 7, the 
interaction between both variables is statistically significant.9
Out of 25 possible combinations of neighborhood and residence attributes, 14 sig-
nificantly predict burglary target choice and lead to slightly different and more nuanced 
appraisals of target suitability (full details in Appendix Tables 7, 8, 9, 10  and 11). First, 
9 For a detailed discussion on how to interpret and present interaction effects in discrete response models, 
see Hilbe (2011) and Mize (2019).
Fig. 1  Estimated odds-ratio of a residence being selected for burglary by neighborhood: median income (in 
€ 1000) and residence: distance from the offender’s home (in km). Top: effect of distance across different 
values of median income. Bottom: effect of median income across different values of distance. Note: Y-axis 
is on a logarithmic scale
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building construction type and certain neighborhood attributes significantly interact: how 
burglars evaluate building construction type when assessing target suitability is moder-
ated by (1) neighborhood income, as well as (2) the proportion of non-Belgian residents 
in the neighborhood, but not by other neighborhood-level attributes. In particular, the 
model results imply that residences in apartment buildings are progressively less attractive 
to burglars as neighborhood affluence increases. In poorer neighborhoods, burglars prefer 
residences in apartment buildings over terraced residences but as neighborhood affluence 
increases burglars prefer targeting terraced residences over residences in apartment build-
ings. Conversely, in neighborhoods with greater proportions of non-Belgians the effect of 
this target accessibility metric is reversed: terraced dwellings are preferred over residences 
in apartment buildings in predominantly Belgian neighborhoods but as relatively more 
non-Belgians live in a neighborhood residences in apartment buildings have greater odds 
of being burglarized than terraced residences.
Second, although number of occupants alone is not a significant predictor of bur-
glary target choice, the interaction effects suggest that its effect may be conditional upon 
neighborhood context: number of occupants interacted with (3) neighborhood affluence, 
(4) proportion non-Belgians, and (5) proportion rental units. The directions are different 
across neighborhood type. Interaction effect (3) suggests that residences with fewer occu-
pants stand out for burglars in poorer neighborhoods whereas burglars prefer residences 
with more occupants in more affluent neighborhoods suggesting perhaps that burglars are 
prepared to accept more risks when operating in more affluent neighborhoods. This may 
be indicative of a degree of sophistication and cost–benefit balancing in target selection: 
taking additional risks may be justified in light of richer pickings. The reverse is true for 
neighborhoods with greater proportions of non-Belgians: burglars prefer residences with 
fewer occupants, and this preference is stronger as the proportion of non-Belgians in the 
neighborhood increases. Interaction effect (5) similarly implies that burglars prefer resi-
dences with fewer occupants, and that this preference is stronger as the proportion of rental 
units increases. Combined, the effects suggest that burglars do not compensate decreases 
in the degree of guardianship at the neighborhood level by taking additional risks at the 
residence level. It seems, that burglars are risk averse both in terms of their selecting resi-
dences in neighborhoods which may have weaker guardianship and their selecting resi-
dences that may have fewer risks to burglarize combined.
Third, number of residential units interact with (6) neighborhood income, (7) propor-
tion of non-Belgians in the neighborhood, and (8) proportion of rental units. Generally 
speaking, burglars prefer fewer residential units per building but their preference varies 
somewhat across neighborhood context. In poorer neighborhoods, burglars have a slight 
preference for residences in multi-unit complexes over single-unit residences, but their 
preference reverses in more affluent neighborhoods where single-unit residences are clearly 
preferred. Although this could suggest that increased affluence at the neighborhood level 
may not offset additional risks at the residence level, this could also reflect the clustering 
of single-unit dwellings in more well-off neighborhoods. Interaction effect (7) implies that 
two-unit residences are preferred over single-unit residences in neighborhoods with smaller 
proportions of non-Belgians, but the opposite is true for neighborhoods with greater pro-
portions of non-Belgians. Although burglars prefer single-unit residences over residences 
in multi-unit housing complexes in neighborhoods with fewer proportions of non-Belgians, 
the opposite effect is briefly observed in neighborhoods with the greatest proportions of 
non-Belgians. Single-unit residences are preferred in neighborhoods with low to medium 
proportions of rental units, but residences in multi-unit complexes are preferred in neigh-
borhoods with the greatest proportions of rental units. These interaction effects would 
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suggest that risk minimization, both at the neighborhood and residence level, is a generally 
prevailing strategy in burglary target selection. Although the lowest levels of neighborhood 
guardianship may sometimes convince burglars to accept additional risks of detection at 
the target level.
Fourth, neighborhood context does not generally influence burglars’ appraisal of renter-
occupied residences, except for (9) the proportion of rental units in a neighborhood. The 
effect suggests that overall burglars prefer renter-occupied over owner-occupied residences 
but their preference is less outspoken in neighborhoods with greater proportions of rental 
units. This would suggest that once a certain guardianship threshold is reached at the 
neighborhood level, targeting residences that signal reduced guardianship may become less 
important to burglars.
Finally, interaction effects for distance and all neighborhood attributes are significant: 
distance interacted with (10) neighborhood income, (11) neighborhood residential density, 
(12) proportion of non-Belgians in the neighborhood, (13) neighborhood proportion of 
rental units, and (14) prior burglary activity in the neighborhood. With the exception of the 
interaction with prior burglary, all interaction effects with distance confirm that burglars 
prefer to target residences nearby their home and keep travel efforts minimal, regardless 
of neighborhood context. In other words, keeping travel to a minimum is a dominant tar-
get selection strategy for burglars. However, the opposite is observed when considering 
prior burglary. In fact, considerations with regard to travel efforts may not be in play when 
selecting targets in neighborhoods where burglars were previously active. The latter effect 
may further be explained in terms of planned burglary behavior: once suitable targets have 
previously been identified the costs of travel to those targets may be worth the additional 
benefits of operating in a familiar area.
Taken together, these interaction effects demonstrate considerable sophistication in 
burglars’ spatial target selection and support the idea that what makes targets attractive 
to burglars is clearly a combination of the individual target as well as its context. Trade-
offs between multiple spatial levels exist and impact target selection decisions. Obviously, 
the systematic tests of all possible cross-level interaction effects is an exercise to explore 
which combinations of neighborhood-level and residence-level attributes have explanatory 
potential and could be candidates for further theorizing and empirical investigation. Conse-
quently, the reported findings on interactions should be regarded as tentative.
Discussion
By stating that the three most important aspects of real estate are “location, location, and 
location”, many real estate advisors warn prospective buyers against a myopic focus on the 
individual property and urge them to carefully consider the property’s surroundings. Based 
on the analysis of 679 cleared burglaries committed by 577 burglars, our findings demon-
strate that residential burglars adhere to this advice as well. Their choice of targets appears 
to be informed by both house attributes and neighborhood attributes, and the evaluation of 
house attributes varies in relation to their neighborhood context. Thereby, our findings offer 
support for the hitherto untested theoretical proposition that burglars’ target selection is 
informed by multiple attributes at multiple spatial scales and possibly also by combinations 
of those attributes across multiple spatial scales (Bernasco 2009, 2010a; Brantingham and 
Brantingham 1978; Cornish and Clarke 1986; Taylor and Gottfredson 1986). Even though 
some of our hypotheses were not supported by the empirical evidence and our investigation 
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of the existence of cross-level interaction effects was explorative, our contribution high-
lights the multi-level nature of burglars’ target selection strategies and thereby extends the 
theoretical and empirical literature on this topic (e.g., Bernasco 2010a; Townsley et  al. 
2015; Vandeviver et al. 2015a). Through the interaction effects, it also offers insight into 
the sophistication and weighing of costs-benefits involved in burglary target selection.
Our results carry implications for theory and research on offender spatial decision-mak-
ing. In particular, the results of our study are important for how we should think about 
burglary target selection and, more generally, offender spatial decision-making. First, our 
analysis offers support for the rational choice perspective’s hypothesis that burglars rely on 
information with regard to environmental features at multiple spatial scales when selecting 
a suitable target. They show that it is combinations of neighborhood and residence attrib-
utes that determine target suitability. Although burglars might sometimes accept trade-offs, 
ultimately both the neighborhood and the residence must be suitable for burglary. Previ-
ously, discrete spatial choice studies either modeled burglars’ choice of target area using 
neighborhood attributes only (Bernasco and Nieuwbeerta 2005; Townsley et al. 2015) or 
were limited to studying the effect of residence attributes on burglary target choice (Van-
deviver et al. 2015a). Our results now extend these studies and indicate that future work on 
burglary target selection could profit from taking into account environmental features of 
multiple levels of spatial aggregation.
Second, the adopted model of target selection is not burglary specific. It is a generic 
model that is applicable to offending in both instrumental and expressive crimes (see 
Brantingham and Brantingham 1978, 1984). For example, the selection of suitable spots 
for graffiti writing is influenced by both features of the larger area and the specific spot. 
Area characteristics such as the presence of particular target audiences and high degrees of 
graffiti tolerance are major considerations for graffiti writers in their search for a suitable 
graffiti writing spot (Ferrell and Weide 2010). But individual graffiti spot features, such as 
surface type, are also very important (Ferrell 1993, p. 73; van Loon 2014). Thus, research-
ers examining target selection and spatial decision-making in other crime types may want 
to jointly consider attributes at multiple spatial levels in their analyses as well.
Our study opens up at least two avenues for future research. First, given the well-corrob-
orated finding that burglary risk of a residence is heightened in the wake of a previous bur-
glary (Ellingworth et al. 1995; Farrell and Pease 2001; Polvi et al. 1991), repeated victimi-
zation could be reflected in repeated targeting of the same residence by the same offenders. 
Extant research has only considered whether offenders tend to return to offend in the same 
neighborhood (Bernasco et al. 2015; Lammers et al. 2015), but future studies could inves-
tigate more rigorously whether burglars indeed return to the very same residences they 
recently targeted, a hypothesis suggested by the findings reported by Bernasco (2008) and 
by Johnson et al. (2009).
Second, future research could consider short-distance spatial spillover mechanisms in 
greater detail. Spatial spillover occurs if the attributes of a residence affect the likelihood 
that nearby residences are being burglarized. For example, a residence surrounded by unat-
tractive residences may be a more suitable target to burglars than a comparable residence 
surrounded by attractive residences. In particular, this approach could leverage insights 
from burglary near-repeat victimization research (Johnson et  al. 2007; Townsley et  al. 
2003). For example, burglary victims may improve security measures that actually increase 
the target attractiveness of neighboring residences because these lack the additional secu-
rity measures.
In discussing the suggestions for future research, we have also touched upon the 
implications of our study results for crime prevention practice and crime control policy. 
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If burglary victims protect themselves and improve household security after having been 
victimized, offenders who return to the same property may find the place better protected 
and target a nearby property instead. The promotion of private prevention may thus have 
the unintended consequence of displacing burglary to nearby targets. Ultimately, this may 
render preventative action collectively fruitless. At a practical level, this implies that pre-
ventative measures implemented in the wake of a burglary should neither be restricted to 
the recently targeted residence nor should they be taken in isolation of the neighborhood. 
Instead, they should consider the actual target as well as neighboring residences and the 
wider community context. Our finding that burglary risk is affected by both residence-level 
and neighborhood-level attributes underlines this, since it suggests that burglary preven-
tion is optimized by a combination of private and collective efforts. Our findings show that 
detached residences, rented residences, and properties nearby the homes of burglars have 
an elevated risk of being targeted, and that the same holds true for low  residential-den-
sity neighborhoods and neighborhoods recently targeted by burglars. Moreover, the effects 
of certain neighborhood and residential attributes appear to depend on each other, which 
could further indicate that individual preventative action may not be successful unless 
accompanying prevention measures are taken at the neighborhood level to remedy features 
outside the control of individual homeowners. Admittedly, the current indicators at both 
levels are too limited to suggest specific preventative actions or develop prevention strate-
gies, in particular because they provide sparse evidence on the underlying mechanisms. 
Nonetheless, they highlight the dual-level nature of burglary spatial decision-making and 
stress the importance of residence and neighborhood features in the burglary problem.
It is important to acknowledge that our research is subject to similar limitations as prior 
crime location choice studies, including that we assume that burglary trips start from the 
offender’s home (Bernasco and Nieuwbeerta 2005; Townsley et al. 2015), that we analyzed 
co-offending burglaries separately as individual decisions (Bernasco et al. 2015), and that 
we assume that offenders have full information on all the alternatives and can discriminate 
between each of the 138,000 residences in the study area. This last assumption, in par-
ticular, becomes increasingly unsustainable as spatial units of analysis become more fine-
grained and choice sets grow dramatically in size (Ruiter 2017; Vandeviver 2015).
Three additional qualifications, specific to this study, must be made. First, our findings 
rely solely on detected, reported, and cleared burglaries. In particular, a subset of burglars 
and burglaries was purposely selected to meet our study’s criteria. Admittedly, this may 
bias our results if cleared burglaries are a non-probabilistic sample from all burglaries. 
While there is evidence to suggest that burglars who are caught in the act and who have 
their burglaries witnessed are more likely to be identified by the police (Coupe and Girling 
2001; Coupe and Griffiths 1996), the same studies suggest that it is difficult to predict 
which burglars will be caught in the act or have their burglaries witnessed by bystand-
ers. In addition, comparing identified and unidentified offenders from a DNA-database, 
Lammers (2014) established that spatial offending patterns for both groups were similar. 
Therefore, burglary clearance may be subject to sufficient randomness to consider cleared 
burglaries as a probabilistic sample of all burglaries that allows for tentative generaliza-
tions. Additional burglary selection criteria that we imposed may also bias our results. This 
is an undesirable but inevitable consequence of any approach that considers offender char-
acteristics (e.g., prior offences) and offender-area interactions (e.g., distance between the 
offender’s home and target), including the discrete spatial choice approach. However, alter-
native methodologies such as ethnography and offender interviews similarly suffer from 
non-probability biases, focusing strongly on prolific offenders (Townsley et  al. 2015) or 
reporting on idiosyncratic events (Vandeviver et al. 2015a).
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Second, Census data are not collected for scientific purposes and consequently do not 
contain all variables that are potentially relevant predictors for burglary target selection. 
Certain residential features, such as presence of an alarm, observability, and ease of entry 
or escape, but also situational cues, such as homeowner presence at the time of the bur-
glary, could not be included in our analyses. In doing so, we may have inadvertently over-
estimated the effects of the included neighborhood and residence variables on burglary 
target selection. However, large-scale residence-level data are scarce and the scale of our 
study made systematically collecting residential features practically infeasible. Moreover, 
situational cues are important but such time-variable features are also difficult to measure 
reliably and are therefore excluded altogether from observational studies of burglary target 
selection (Langton and Steenbeek 2017; Peeters et al. 2017). While the omission of certain 
residential attributes is undesirable, this does not completely invalidate the results of our 
study. Our models include environmental features that are mostly stable over time and thus 
serve to illustrate how time-invariable features of neighborhoods and residences affect bur-
glary target selection.
Third, our neighborhood and residence data were not measured at the same time of the 
burglary. The burglary data span the period 2005-2014 but the neighborhood and residence 
data are for 2011 only. As a result, we cannot rule out that some of the neighborhood and 
residence features have changed since the time of the burglary. However, the majority of 
neighborhood and residential features included in the Census data are mostly stable over 
time and will likely not have changed since the burglary.
In conclusion, theoretical accounts of offender spatial decision-making have highlighted 
that target selection may be affected not only by attributes of potential targets but also by 
attributes of their spatial context. However, few prior empirical tests have taken this pos-
sibility into account. None have investigated the combined impact of multiple levels of spa-
tial aggregation. In this study, we showed that area-level attributes and target-level attrib-
utes can be estimated simultaneously. Echoing the “location, location, location” advice in 
real estate, we established that both area and target attributes affect burglars’ target choices.
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Appendix
See Figs. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and Tables 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11.
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Fig. 2  Estimated odds-ratio of a residence being selected for burglary by neighborhood: median income (in 
€ 1000) and residence: building type (reference category is terraced). Note: Y-axis is on a logarithmic scale
Fig. 3  Estimated odds-ratio of a residence being selected for burglary by neighborhood: median income 
(in € 1000) and residence: number of occupants. Top: effect of number of occupants across different values 
of median income. Bottom: effect of median income across different values of number of occupants. Note: 
Y-axis is on a logarithmic scale
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Fig. 4  Estimated odds-ratio of a residence being selected for burglary by neighborhood: median income (in 
€ 1000) and residence: number of residential units (reference category is 1 residential unit). Note: Y-axis is 
on a logarithmic scale
Fig. 5  Estimated odds-ratio of a residence being selected for burglary by neighborhood: residential density 
and residence: distance from the offender’s home (in km). Top: effect of distance across different values of 
residential density. Bottom: effect of residential density across different values of distance. Note: Y-axis is 
on a logarithmic scale
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Fig. 6  Estimated odds-ratio of a residence being selected for burglary by neighborhood: proportion non-
Belgians and residence: building type (reference category is terraced). Note: Y-axis is on a logarithmic 
scale
Fig. 7  Estimated odds-ratio of a residence being selected for burglary by neighborhood: proportion non-
Belgians and residence: number of occupants. Top: effect of number of occupants across different values 
of proportion non-Belgians. Bottom: effect of proportion non-Belgians across different values of number of 
occupants. Note: Y-axis is on a logarithmic scale
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Fig. 8  Estimated odds-ratio of a residence being selected for burglary by neighborhood: proportion non-
Belgians and residence: number of residential units (reference category is 1 residential unit). Note: Y-axis is 
on a logarithmic scale
Fig. 9  Estimated odds-ratio of a residence being selected for burglary by neighborhood: proportion non-
Belgians and residence: distance from the offender’s home (in km). Top: effect of distance across different 
values of proportion non-Belgians. Bottom: effect of proportion non-Belgians across different values of dis-
tance. Note: Y-axis is on a logarithmic scale
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Fig. 10  Estimated odds-ratio of a residence being selected for burglary by neighborhood: proportion rental 
units and residence: number of occupants. Top: effect of number of occupants across different values of 
proportion rental units. Bottom: effect of proportion rental units across different values of number of occu-
pants. Note: Y-axis is on a logarithmic scale
Fig. 11  Estimated odds-ratio of a residence being selected for burglary by neighborhood: proportion rental 
units and residence: number of residential units (reference category is 1 residential unit). Note: Y-axis is on 
a logarithmic scale
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Fig. 12  Estimated odds-ratio of a residence being selected for burglary by neighborhood: proportion rental 
units and residence: renter-occupied (reference category is no). Note: Y-axis is on a logarithmic scale
Fig. 13  Estimated odds-ratio of a residence being selected for burglary by neighborhood: proportion rental 
units and residence: distance from the offender’s home (in km). Top: effect of distance across different val-
ues of proportion rental units. Bottom: effect of proportion rental units across different values of distance. 
Note: Y-axis is on a logarithmic scale
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Table 5  Comparison of 
characteristics of burglarized 
neighborhoods before and after 
application of data selection 
criteria
1 All cleared burglaries, input for data selection procedure (N = 1741 
burglaries, N = 1871 burglars)
2 After applying all data selection criteria (N = 679 burglaries, N = 577 
burglars)
Variables Initial  sample1 Final  sample2
Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Median income (€ 1000) 19.41 (3.54) 19.18 (3.58)
Number of residences (1000/km2) 4.35 (2.50) 4.26 (2.44)
Proportion non-Belgians 15.05 (8.71) 14.97 (8.58)
Proportion rental units 42.17 (13.12) 43.25 (14.33)
Fig. 14  Estimated odds-ratio of a residence being selected for burglary by neighborhood: prior burglary 
0–6  months (reference category is no) and residence: distance from the offender’s home (in km). Note: 
Y-axis is on a logarithmic scale. Quasi-complete separation in the data may render the estimated odds ratios 
questionable and caution should be taken when interpreting these results
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Table 6  Model estimates for neighborhood only and residence only main effects conditional logit models of 
burglary target choice in Ghent, Belgium (679 burglaries, 577 burglars, 138,321 residential units)
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
1 The offender committed a previous burglary in the neighborhood less than 6 months ago (0/1)
Variables Neighborhood only 
model
Residence only model
Exp(B) SE(B) Exp(B) SE(B)
Median income (€ 1000) .95* .02 – –
Residential density .86*** .02 – –
Proportion non-Belgians .99 .01 – –
Proportion rental units 1.00 .00 – –
Prior burglary in neighborhood 0–6 months1 19.61*** .16 – –
Building type: semi-detached – – 1.49** .14
Building type: detached – – 1.87*** .12
Building type: part of apartment building – – .77 .15
Number of occupants – – 1.02 .03
Number of residential units: two residential units – – .74 .19
Number of residential units: three or more residential units – – .53*** .10
Rental unit: yes – – 2.05*** .08
Distance (km) .45*** .04 .44*** .04
Proportion rental units * rental unit: yes – – – –
AIC (df) 23,917.64 (6) 24,028.80 (8)
BIC (df) 23,944.77 (6) 24,064.96 (8)
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Table 8  Model estimates for cross-level interaction effect conditional logit models of burglary target choice 
in Ghent, Belgium (679 burglaries, 577 burglars, 138,321 residential units)
(1) Neighborhood: residential density * residence: building type; (2) neighborhood: residential density * 
residence: number of occupants; (3) neighborhood: residential density * residence: number of residential 
units; (4) neighborhood: residential density * residence: rental status; (5) neighborhood: residential density 
* residence: distance (km). For clarity and brevity, only the interaction effects and associated main effects 
are printed
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
a Omitted for brevity
Variables Cross-level interaction effect models (neighborhood: residential density)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Exp(B)
(SE(B))
Exp(B)
(SE(B))
Exp(B)
(SE(B))
Exp(B)
(SE(B))
Exp(B)
(SE(B))
Residential density .90*** (.02) .92** (.03) .88*** (.02) .91*** (.03) .97*** (.03)
Building type: semi-detached 1.71* (.26) a a a a
Building type: detached 1.19 (.24) a a a a
Building type: part of apart-
ment building
.80 (.32) a a a a
Number of occupants a 1.07 (.05) a a a
Number of residential units: 
two residential units
a a 1.36 (.39) a a
Number of residential units: 
three or more residential 
units
a a .45*** (.21) a a
Rental unit: yes a a a 2.19*** (.17) a
Distance (km) a a a a .54*** (.06)
Residential density * building 
type: semi-detached
.84 (.09) a a a a
Residential density * building 
type: detached
1.05 (.24) a a a a
Residential density * Build-
ing type: Part of apartment 
building
1.00 (.32) a a a a
Residential density * number 
of occupants
a .99 (.01) a a a
Residential density * number 
of residential units: two 
residential units
a a .88 (.09) a a
Residential density * number 
of residential units: three or 
more residential units
a a 1.06
(.04)
a a
Residential density * rental 
unit: yes
a a a .98
(.03)
a
Residential density * distance 
(km)
a a a a
AIC (df) 23,824.72 (16) 23,824.16 
(14)
23,822.44 (15) 23,825.30 
(14)
23,812.77 
(14)
BIC (df) 23,897.05 (16) 23,887.45 
(14)
23,890.25 (15) 23,888.59 
(14)
23,876.06 
(14)
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Table 9  Model estimates for cross-level interaction effect conditional logit models of burglary target choice 
in Ghent, Belgium (679 burglaries, 577 burglars, 138,321 residential units)
(1) Neighborhood: proportion non-Belgians * residence: building type; (2) neighborhood: proportion non-
Belgians * residence: number of occupants; (3) neighborhood: proportion non-Belgians * residence: num-
ber of residential units; (4) neighborhood: proportion non-Belgians * residence: rental status; (5) neigh-
borhood: proportion non-Belgians * Residence: distance (km). For clarity and brevity, only the interaction 
effects and associated main effects are printed
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
a Omitted for brevity
Variables Cross-level interaction effect models
(neighborhood: proportion non-Belgians)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Exp(B)
(SE(B))
Exp(B)
(SE(B))
Exp(B)
(SE(B))
Exp(B)
(SE(B))
Exp(B)
(SE(B))
Proportion non-Belgians .98* (.02) .96 (.01) .98* (.09) .99 (.01) 1.01 (.01)
Building type: semi-detached 1.34 (.24) a a a a
Building type: detached 1.36 (.22) a a a a
Building type: part of apart-
ment building
.24*** (.31) a a a a
Number of occupants a 1.13* (.06) a a a
Number of residential units: 
two residential units
a a 2.01 (.39) a a
Number of residential units: 
three or more residential 
units
a a .34*** (.20) a a
Rental unit: yes a a a 1.82*** 
(.17)
a
Distance (km) a a a a .53*** (.06)
Proportion non-Belgians * 
building type: semi-detached
1.00 (.02) a a a a
Proportion non-Belgians * 
building type: detached
1.07 (.02) a a a a
Proportion non-Belgians * 
building type: part of apart-
ment building
.98*** (.01) a a a a
Proportion non-Belgians * 
Number of occupants
a .99* (.01) a a a
Proportion non-Belgians * 
number of residential units: 
Two residential units
a a .93* (.03) a a
Proportion non-Belgians * 
number of residential units: 
three or more residential 
units
a a 1.03** (.01) a a
Proportion non-Belgians * 
rental unit: yes
a a a 1.00 (.01) a
Proportion non-Belgians * 
distance (km)
a a a a .99** (.01)
AIC (df) 23,805.32 
(16)
23,819.99 
(14)
23,808.43 (15) 23,825.16 
(14)
23,814.99 (14)
BIC (df) 23,877.65 
(16)
23,883.27 
(14)
23,876.24 (15) 23,888.45 
(14)
23,878.28 (14)
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Table 10  Model estimates for cross-level interaction effect conditional logit models of burglary target 
choice in Ghent, Belgium (679 burglaries, 577 burglars, 138,321 residential units)
(1) Neighborhood: proportion rental units * residence: building type; (2) neighborhood: proportion rental 
units * residence: number of occupants; (3) neighborhood: proportion rental units * residence: number of 
residential units; (4) neighborhood: proportion rental units * residence: rental status; (5) neighborhood: pro-
portion rental units * residence: distance (km). For clarity and brevity, only the interaction effects and asso-
ciated main effects are printed
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
a Omitted for brevity
Variables Cross-level interaction effect models (neighborhood: proportion rental units)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Exp(B)
(SE(B))
Exp(B)
(SE(B))
Exp(B)
(SE(B))
Exp(B)
(SE(B))
Exp(B)
(SE(B))
Proportion rental units 1.00 (.01) 1.01* (.01) .98** (.01) 1.01 (.01) 1.02** (.01)
Building type: semi-
detached
1.75 (.36) a a a a
Building type: detached 1.07 (.39) a a a a
Building type: part of apart-
ment building
.56 (.60) a a a a
Number of occupants a 1.40*** (.09) a a a
Number of residential units: 
two residential units
a a 2.06 (.86) a a
Number of residential units: 
three or more residential 
units
a a .17*** (.33) a a
Rental unit: yes a a a 3.51*** (.28) a
Distance (km) a a a a .69*** (.09)
Proportion rental units * 
building type: semi-
detached
.99 (.01) a a a a
Proportion rental units * 
building type: detached
1.00 (.01) a a a a
Proportion rental units * 
building type: part of 
apartment building
1.01 (.01) a a a a
Proportion rental units * 
number of occupants
a .99*** (.01) a a a
Proportion rental units * 
number of residential 
units: two residential units
a a .98 (.02) a a
Proportion rental units * 
Number of residential 
units: three or more resi-
dential units
a a 1.03*** (.01) a a
Proportion rental units * 
Rental unit: yes
a a a .99* (.01) a
Proportion rental units * 
distance (km)
a a a a .99*** (.01)
AIC (df) 23,826.13 
(16)
23,811.61 (14) 23,808.05 (15) 23,821.40 
(14)
23,800.57 (14)
BIC (df) 23,898.46 
(16)
23,874.90 (14) 23,875.86 (15) 23,884.69 
(14)
23,863.86 (14)
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